Nomy Arpaly, Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, is interested in ethics, moral psychology, action theory, metaethics, and free will.  She is the author of Merit, Meaning and Human Bondage (Princeton University Press, 2006) and Unprincipled Virtue: an Inquiry into Human Agency (Oxford University Press, 2002). Her journal articles include: "How It is Not Like Diabetes: Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist," Nous, 2007; "Which Autonomy," Freedom and Determinism (MIT Press, 2004); "Moral Responsibility, Applied Ethics and Complex Theories of Autonomy," Personal Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2004); "Moral Worth", Journal of Philosophy (May 2002); "On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment,” Ethics (April 2000); and "Hamlet and the Utilitarians" Philosophical Studies (2000).  She is currently thinking about:  action explanations, will power, open-mindedness, and complexity without particularism. 

Guy Axtell teaches philosophy, religious studies, and humanities Honors courses at University of Nevada, Reno. He is editor of Knowledge, Belief and Character (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), and administrator/editor of JanusBlog: The Virtue Theory Discussion Forum. He has published articles in collections, journals and reference work on the topics of: metaphilosophy, value theory, ethics and epistemology, American pragmatism, and comparative philosophy.

Jason Baehr is an Assistant Professor of philosophy at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. He has published in the areas of epistemology and virtue theory. He is presently completing a monograph on virtue epistemology titled The Inquiring Mind: On the Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology.

Heather Battaly is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Cal State Fullerton.  She loves to teach logic, epistemology, and ethics. She is author of several articles on intellectual virtue, including: “Virtue Epistemology” (Philosophy Compass, 2008), “Intellectual Virtue and Knowing one’s Sexual Orientation” (Sex and Ethics, 2007), and “Teaching Intellectual Virtues” (Teaching Philosophy, 2006). She is also co-editor of Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston (2005).

Michael Brady is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Before arriving in Glasgow he taught at the University of Stirling. His research interests are in normative ethics, metaethics, and epistemology, and his current research is focused on relations between virtues, values and emotions. He has published a number of articles on these topics, and has edited two collections on the virtues with Duncan Pritchard: Virtues: Moral and Epistemic (Blackwell, 2003) and Epistemic Virtue and Virtue Epistemology (a special edition of Philosophical Studies, 2006).

Amy Coplan is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Fullerton.  Her primary areas of research are philosophy of emotion, ancient Greek philosophy, and philosophy of film.  She is especially interested in questions regarding empathy, emotional contagion, and emotional engagement with film and has recently published on these topics in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Film Studies, and Film and Philosophy.  She and Peter Goldie are currently co-editing an interdisciplinary collection on empathy (Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, OUP), and she is editing a collection on the film Blade Runner for Routledge’s new “Philosophers on Film” series.

Roger Crisp is Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St Anne's College, Oxford, and Chair of the Oxford Philosophy Faculty Board. He is the author of Reasons and the Good (Clarendon Press, 2006), and translated Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for Cambridge University Press. He edited How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues (Clarendon Press, 1996) and (with Michael Slote) Oxford Readings on Virtue Ethics (OUP, 1997).

Miranda Fricker is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London. She is the author of Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007), which explores how relations of social power and identity impinge in our epistemic practices to produce distinctively epistemic forms of injustice—injustices in which someone is undermined specifically in their capacity as a knower. She co-edited The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy with Jennifer Hornsby (2000); and she is co-author of Reading Ethics, co-written with Sam Guttenplan, an introductory textbook giving interactive commentaries on classic texts in moral philosophy (forthcoming, Blackwell, 2008). Most recently her work has focused on the significance of situating our epistemic practices, including moral epistemic practices, in time - both real time, and the semi-fictional time of genealogical explanation.

Thomas Hurka is Jackman Distinguished Professor of Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto and the author of Perfectionism (1993), Principles: Short Essays on Ethics (1993), and Virtue, Vice, and Value (2001).

Wayne Riggs is an Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma, and got his PhD in philosophy from the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. He currently works on value-centered issues in epistemology, including the nature of epistemic value, the value of truth, the value of knowledge, and the nature and significance of epistemic luck.

Christine Swanton teaches at the Philosophy Department, University of Auckland, New Zealand. Her field is virtue ethics on which she has written a book: Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (paperback OUP 2005). She is currently working on the virtue ethics of Hume and Nietzsche. 

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski is George Lynn Cross Research Professor of Philosophy and Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma, where she has taught since 1999. She was born and educated in California, where she received a Bachelor’s degree from Stanford University, a Masters degree from the University of California at Berkeley, and a Ph.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles. She taught for twenty years at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, where she chaired the Department. She is past President of the Society of Christian Philosophers and past President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. She has given many endowed lectures, including the Romanell Lectures of Phi Beta Kappa, and the McCarthy Lectures at the Gregorian University, Rome, and she has lectured widely in Europe, North America, and China. Her books include The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, (Oxford University Press, 1991), Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Philosophy of Religion: An Historical Introduction (Blackwell, 2007), and On Epistemology (forthcoming, Wadsworth), as well as many edited collections and articles in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and virtue ethics. She is an honorary lifetime member of Alpha Sigma Nu, the Jesuit Honor Society, and is a member of the National Research Council.