THE AIMS OF THIS WEB SITE

At the organizational meeting last year, it was planned that this web site would be used not just to post information but as a place for philosophical discussion. Consequently it has been designed to allow for that.

In order to get those discussions off the ground, I propose the following. At last year’s meeting, those present not only named the society but also drew up a statement of aims. Those aims were posted to all the proposed members last July. Professor Cora Diamond, in notifying us of her interest in being a member, also submitted some criticism of the statement of the society’s aims.

What I propose to do, to inaugurate the desired discussions, is to set out the statement of aims once again, then present, with her approval, Professor Diamond’s criticisms and attach to them my response.

While the issues will not be wholly philosophical, it should have the virtue of leading others into more substantial discussions.

That we start with the below thoughts does not mean that anyone who is inclined to produce some other set of ideas for society members to think about is precluded from submitting them to this site. What is below is simply a way of starting.

(I have prefaced this material with the statement of aims so as to facilitate the discussion.)

AIMS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN WITTGENSTEIN SOCIETY

It is a sign of our intellectual times that Wittgenstein’s later work is not a major factor in current philosophical practice and that the thought and work of his Oxonian and American offspring (often called ‘ordinary language philosophy’) has fallen into even greater disfavor.

Philosophy is suffering thereby.

It is the aim of the North American Wittgenstein Society to begin the rectification of that situation by providing means for philosophical thought and work in the broad Wittgensteinian tradition exemplified in his Philosophical Investigations.

The area to be covered is not merely the later Wittgenstein, but also those significant philosophers who arose in connection with his later thought: e.g. Austin, Ryle, Strawson, Bouwsma, Cavell, Searle.... While some of the sponsored work will be expository and exegetical, the Society especially encourages original philosophical thought in the manner of ‘ordinary language philosophy’.

CORA DIAMOND’S COMMENTS ON THE STATEMENT OF AIMS

Thank you for your letters about the Wittgenstein society. I should like to be kept on the mailing list.

I do object, however, to the introduction of what seems to me a particular reading of Wittgenstein into the very statement of the aims of the society. You say that it is a sign of our intellectual times that Wittgenstein’s later work is not a major factor in current philosophical practice. You seem to be taking for granted that nothing much is to be gained in understanding Wittgenstein by taking him to be (in the words of Peter Winch and Steve Gerrard) ‘one philosopher’, not a pair of philosophers: ‘early Wittgenstein’ and ‘later Wittgenstein’. My own view, for what it is worth, is that the presumption interferes with our capacity to learn from the Philosophical Investigations and other works of Wittgenstein’s later years. I think it is rather a pity having the two-Wittgenstein view virtually written into the statement of aims of the Society.

I also wonder what exactly you have in mind when you describe Austin as having arisen in connection with the later thought of Wittgenstein. He read and discussed Frege with his philosophical colleagues. Did he think much at all about Wittgenstein’s later writings?

Cora Diamond

A REPLY TO CORA DIAMOND’S COMMENTS

Professor Diamond has two objections to the Society’s statement of aims. I think she is mistaken on each count and that a discussion will provide an excellent opportunity to push Society members into their own responses and thoughts as a way of initiating on-going philosophical activity.

(1) The Two Wittgenstein’s View.

The Statement of Aims clearly specifies that the Society (NAWS) is encouraging philosophical work about that body of thought which is now almost universally referred to as that of the ‘later Wittgenstein’, as well as encouraging philosophically original work in that manner or spirit. The aims equally certainly are not intended to have NAWS sponsor work about ‘the earlier Wittgenstein’, say the Tractatus and its surroundings.

Professor Diamond believes that such a statement of aims puts NAWS in the position of officially subscribing to a certain interpretation of the entire breadth of Wittgenstein’s philosophical life, namely the ‘two Wittgenstein’s view’. That view is that the Tractatus and the Investigations (et al) are so radically different that they might as well have been written by two different philosophers.

The aims as written, however, did not grow out of such a view and do not commit the Society to the ‘two persons’ interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical life.

Rather stating the aims in that fashion is based upon a purely practical consideration.

The opening of the statement says that "Wittgenstein’s later work is not a major factor in current philosophical practice." Anyone who has observed the change in philosophy from the 1960’s to the present will find that obvious, not in need of evidential support. Not only are there not significant quantities of original Wittgenstein inspired papers and books being published or delivered in the philosophical market, but Wittgenstein’s later work itself is not a significant object of exegesis.

(I sat on the Pacific APA program committee for three years recently, being given the role ‘the Wittgenstein expert’, charged with evaluating submitted papers on Wittgenstein. During those years there was not one paper submitted on the later work, the Investigations, etc. Any sessions on the later Wittgenstein which appeared on the Pacific program during that time were there because I arranged for them to be there.)

It is those facts which were referred to in the Statement of Aims - the philosophical situation described by those facts is that which the Society aims at changing.

On the other hand, and it is this contrast which produced the aims adopted at last year’s meeting, there is substantial work presently being put on the philosophical market on the Tractatus, some of the best of that by Professor Diamond and other members of this Society.

(As a member of the Pacific program committee, I did receive papers every year, I believe, dealing with the Tractatus.

(Further, as a quick check about these claims, I ran a (crude) search on the new Philosopher’s Index CDRom. I asked about titles with the word ‘Tractatus’ in it, items in English only published from 1990 to 2000: there were 123 such items which turned up; I then did a search with the same parameters except for substituting ‘Philosophical Investigations’: there were only 29 items listed. That huge difference is what I had in mind about the recent interest in the earlier work as compared to the later.)

Now, the point of describing the Society’s aims in the way we did is to make a philosophical place for work on the later Wittgenstein given that there is at present so little being done on it and given that the philosophical interest in the Tractatus is (relatively) robust.

Other than D.Z. Phillip’s Philosophical Investigations, there is no journal which welcomes work about or derived from the later Wittgenstein unless it is written in opposition to that thought. That cannot be said about the Tractatus at present.

Moreover, the Tractatus attracts philosophers who are fundamentally hostile to the later Wittgenstein. Not all of those attracted to Tractatus scholarship today are hostile of course (see Diamond and Conant for instance.) But there are many who see the Tractatus as a legitimate object of study whose fundamental philosophical commitments are to Frege and who stand in strong opposition to the later Wittgenstein. To advertise the Society as an organization interested in Wittgenstein simpliciter is to attract philosophers who do not want to see the later Wittgenstein becoming more central in philosophical practice.

Lastly, suppose we accept Professor Diamond’s idea that if we do not, as a Society, support any work on Wittgenstein, if we do not encourage work on the Tractatus, we will thereby be inhibiting our ability to grasp the later work. There is truth to that. Consequently, it is my own hope that the current Statement of Aims commits NAWS to a kind of Affirmative Action program. The Society is intended to open opportunities which will rectify a wrong. When the wrong has vanished, the program, namely those aims, will disappear, become unnecessary.

But until such time as we have a much richer view of the later works through immensely more scholarship on them and especially through philosophical work being conducted in light of Wittgenstein’s later thought, one cannot tell whether and how the stuff from the Tractatus helps grasp more of the later work.

(2) In Re Austin, et al.

The aims say that the Society is to be concerned with "those significant philosophers who arose in connection with his later thought, e.g. Austin, Strawson, Ryle, Bouwsma, Cavell, Searle...."

Professor Diamond says in reply: "I also wonder what exactly you have in mind when you describe Austin as having arisen in connection with the later thought of Wittgenstein. He read and discussed Frege with his philosophical colleagues. Did he think much at all about Wittgenstein’s later writings?"

I first have to be a little picky. Nothing the aims says requires that Austin read and thought about Wittgenstein’s later writings. The claim was that Austin, and many others, arose in connection with his later thought.

I will grant that "arose in connection with" is not, in the end, the description of the relationship(s) we want. However, rather than retracting too much, I will attack.

The issue is the relation of Wittgenstein’s post-1929 thought to Oxford philosophy, to Austin, Ryle, Strawson, etc etc. Diamond implies that Austin, at least, was wholly independent of the post-1929 Wittgenstein. That surely isn’t so. There is something to Hacker’s attempt to speak of "the Oxonian offspring", including Austin, of Wittgenstein’s later thought. There is vast room for historical work on the relationships.

But a proper historical understanding of those intellectual developments depends on grasping precisely what the views of Wittgenstein and the other relevant philosophers, including Austin, were. That is precisely the work which is not being done in the present philosophical climate. If Wittgenstein’s later work has fallen into disfavor, then the Oxonian, etc. work has fallen completely from view. (In my years on the APA committee there was not a single reference, so far as I know, to any of that work. And D.Z. Phillips came to delete the reference to ‘ordinary language philosophy’ from the area of concern for his journal because there were no submissions.)

One of the Society’s aims is to make that body of philosphical thought rise from the grave to which it has been consigned by current philosophical attitudes.

I would hope that after NAWS sponsors such a project, a historically more accurate picture would emerge, so that my phrase "arose in connection with" could vanish and be replaced by a more detailed understanding. Professor Diamond’s way would prevent asking just those questions.

(3) The Last Word.

Everything I have written and done here, from using Diamond’s comments to including my response to them, is intended to be a conversation starter, an invitation to discussion and argument (and substantial philosophical work). Unless members of the Society pick up the threads, there will not have been much point to the enterprise. So please do so - and the sooner the better.

Moreover, I do want to note that the Statement of Aims is not eternal writ. Both later, and possibly sooner, they can evolve into a better form. If that is the way the argument goes, then changes will be made.

Merrill Ring